1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland (Part II) by Pech, Laurent
1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland
(Part II)
Laurent Pech 2019-01-17T18:39:21
(Part I here)
4. One missed opportunity: The ECJ ruling of 25
July 2018 concerning the European Arrest Warrant 
The knock-on effects of the deteriorating situation in Poland became notably visible
when an Irish High Court judge decided to delay the extradition of a man to Poland
over concerns about the rule of law there pending a preliminary reference request
sent to the ECJ. This was followed by a vicious press campaign against the Irish
judge, with Mr Marcin Warcho#, Poland’s Deputy Justice Minister (and Poland’s
member of the Venice Commission, no less…) deeming it appropriate to question
the professionalism and integrity of the Irish High Court judge by claiming that she
did not know relevant rules or case law and that her analysis was inter alia ignorant,
lacked common sense but also partial and biased. In addition, the Deputy Justice
Minister did not see any problem with violating the principle of the presumption of
innocence by publicly stating that the Irish High Court was “delaying the punishment
of a serious drug mafia criminal”. As regards Justice Donnelly’s right to seek
clarification from the ECJ, Mr Warcho# said: “such requests should be unbiased. It is
regrettable your court is delaying this punishment completely on biased arguments”. 
In its judgment of 25 July 2018 (LM, C-216/18 PPU), the ECJ established a new
two-step rule of law test based on one it developed regarding potential exceptions
for surrender on the basis of the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment
(Article 4 of the Charter). This new test stated that (i) when confronted with the claim
that a European Arrest Warrant (hereinafter: EAW) request must not be granted
due to systemic or generalised deficiencies liable to affect the independence of
the judiciary in the issuing Member State, the executing judicial authority (Irish
High Court in the present case), must, as a first step, “assess whether there is a
real risk that the individual concerned will suffer a breach” of his fundamental right
to an independent tribunal/to a fair trial “when it is called upon to decide on his
surrender to the authorities of the issuing Member State”; and (ii) “that authority
must, as a second step, assess specifically and precisely whether, in the particular
circumstances of the case, there are substantial grounds for believing that, following
his surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested person will run that risk”. 
This important ruling has been widely commented in particular by many eminent
scholars on this blog. To put it briefly here, we view this ruling by the ECJ as a
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missed opportunity and certainly not as a breakthrough. Despite overwhelming
and damning evidence of a growing systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland,
the Court, rather than offering a systemic answer, opted for an individualised test
requiring a case-by-case assessment. In doing so, we submit the ECJ ignored or
refused to accept reality: in a situation of systemic attacks targeting the whole judicial
system, there is, by definition, already a “real risk” of a breach of the fundamental
rights to an independent tribunal and to a fair trial in every single case. One may
view as particularly unworkable any requirement imposing on a national court acting
as executing judicial authority the need to examine the extent to which systemic
attacks on the rule of law are liable to have an impact at the level of the courts with
jurisdiction over the requested person’s case. We are sorry to say that we also
find absurd to demand that such a national court request from the issuing judicial
authority any information that it considers necessary for assessing whether there is
such a risk. This is akin to asking a potentially compromised court to confirm that it is
not (or not yet) compromised in a context where judges can be subject to kangaroo
disciplinary proceedings just for daring sending questions to the ECJ under Article
267 TFEU (see section 6 for more details). 
In essence, the ECJ has created a test which we find impossible to apply in practice
and disconnected from the reality of a judicial system which is in the process of
being entirely captured by the executive. Anxious to preserve the principles of
mutual trust and mutual recognition while simultaneously affirming the cardinal
importance of the principles of the rule of law and judicial independence in the EU
and in particular in Poland, the ECJ has devised a test which has the potential
of undermining them all. The refusal to hold that the EAW mechanism cannot be
suspended in respect of a Member State outside of a unanimous determination by
the European Council, pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU, that this Member State has
breached Article 2 TEU, is not merely dangerous, it is also flawed. Why? Because it
reflects a failure to read a piece of EU secondary legislation in light of the EU primary
law as it stands on the day of the ruling while justifying this failure on the back of
an out-of-date, non-binding recital which merely does not take into account current
Article 7(1) merely because it was not yet in force when the Framework Decision
on the EAW was adopted! Last but not least, it means that even in a situation
where judicial independence would have been totally annihilated, a case-by-case
assessment would still be required unless – something which is simply politically
unimaginable when you have more than one “rogue state” in the EU – unanimity in
the European Council had been previously reached.  
Be that as it may, we now have several concrete examples of national courts
struggling when it comes to implementing the ECJ’s “Celmer test”. Wouter van
Ballegooij and Petra Bárd spoke of Herculean hurdles in a post published last July.
Recent examples have proved them right. 
Just to give a single example, a Dutch court recently held that 11 surrender cases
must be stayed and more questions sent to the relevant Polish issuing judicial
authorities, as the initial answers provided by Polish courts did not adequately
answer its concerns regarding the independence of the judiciary. This is not however
the first time we saw a non-Polish court sending a second set of questions to Polish
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courts. Indeed, last September, we saw senior Polish judges openly disagreeing
“with each other in letters sent to the High Court in Dublin about the independence
of the Polish judiciary”, with the one judge finding no problem with a court president
appointed on the basis of an arguably unconstitutional law which was referenced as
a source of concern by the Commission in its Article 7(1) TEU proposal…  
We remain deeply sceptical of the ECJ’s test as it is difficult to see how a national
court, no matter how many and well thought questions it is able to produce and send
under the preliminary reference procedure to the ECJ, may ever be able to gather
sufficient evidence to meet the ECJ’s threshold laid down in the second prong of
its EAW rule of law test, i.e., to specifically and precisely prove, in the particular
circumstances of each relevant case that there are substantial grounds for believing
that, following the surrender to the issuing Member State, the requested person
will run a real risk of a breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal.
For instance, the Irish High Court found that the ECJ test cannot be met even in a
situation where a Deputy Justice Minister is recorded to have publicly described the
subject of the EAW as a dangerous criminal (presumption of innocence, anyone?).
More generally speaking, how on earth can one receive a fair trial in a system
without effective constitutional review; without an independent National Council
for the Judiciary (the Polish KRS was suspended from the European Networks of
Councils for the Judiciary for its lack of independence); but with a supreme court
which now arguably includes unlawfully appointed judges, and where each judge
in Poland potentially faces the threat at any point in time of kangaroo disciplinary
proceedings (see below section 6).
In a recent and potentially significant development, the Irish High Court has
asked Ireland’s highest judicial body to clarify whether systemic and generalised
deficiencies in the independence of the relevant national judiciary are “sufficient,
on their own [our emphasis] and in the absence of evidence of deficiencies in other
safeguards for a fair trial, to establish substantial grounds that there is a real risk
of a breach of the essence of the requested person’s right to a fair trial”. This is a
question, however, which can only be authoritatively answered by the ECJ and one
would therefore expect the Irish Supreme Court to refer this point to Luxembourg,
providing the ECJ the needed impetus to fine-tune its test.
5. Several pending preliminary reference cases 
Following the activation of Article 7(1) TEU, a number of Polish courts, including the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, have submitted numerous
references to the ECJ on the basis of the preliminary ruling procedure laid down in
Article 267 TFEU. 
In August 2018, the Supreme Court sent several questions regarding the forced
retirement of its judges and the power to suspend domestic law regarding the
independence of the judiciary. The ECJ has since agreed to expedite the case in
light of the importance of the issues raised, the “serious uncertainties” the disputed
national provisions have created with respect to “functioning of the referring court as
highest national court” as well as Article 267 TFEU, “the keystone of the EU judicial
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system” and one which could not function without independent national courts
according to the ECJ (see order adopted on 26 September 2018 in Case C-522/18). 
Broadly similar questions than the ones submitted in Case C-522/18 have been
subsequently referred by the Polish Supreme Court last October in Case C-668/18
and similarly, the ECJ has agreed to expedite the procedure in this case on 11
December 2018 for the same reasons given previously in the order issued in Case
C-522/18. 
Other preliminary reference proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court concern
the disciplinary regime put in place on the back of the so-called “judicial reforms”,
and in particular the new disciplinary chamber, with the question of whether it may
be considered a “court” within the meaning of EU law one of the issues raised. It
is worth recalling in this respect that in its fourth rule of law recommendation of
20 December 2017, the Commission underlined that Poland’s new disciplinary
regime raises a number of concerns in particular related to the autonomy of the
new disciplinary chamber in the Supreme Court; the removal of a set of procedural
guarantees in disciplinary proceedings conducted against ordinary courts and
Supreme Court judges; and the influence of President of the Republic and the
Minister of Justice on the disciplinary officers. 
To summarise where we are, in addition to Case C-522/18 and Case C-668/18
mentioned above, an additional seven preliminary ruling requests are now pending
before the ECJ (it is not easy to keep track): 
• Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18 (these two cases have been joined with the
expedited procedure requests submitted by the referring courts however
rejected by the ECJ on 1 October 2018); 
• Cases C-585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18 (these three requests have been joined
and expedited procedure granted by the ECJ on 26 November 2018); 
• Case C-623/18 (lodged on 3 October 2018);
• Case C-824/18 (lodged on 28 December 2018). 
To the best of our knowledge, kangaroo disciplinary proceedings have since been
initiated against the judges at the origin of Case C-588/18; Case C-563/18; and Case
C-623/18 (see section 6 below). 
The tactical retreat operated by Polish authorities following the ECJ interim order
regarding their attempted purge the Supreme Court also means that it is unclear
whether the questions submitted in Case C-522/18 and Case C-668/18 still ought
to be answered by the ECJ. According to what was recently reported in the Polish
media, the Polish government has requested that the two cases be dismissed in light
of the latest amendments to the Law on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
must now explain to the ECJ before the end of the month why a preliminary ruling
from the ECJ is still necessary to enable it to give a judgment in these two cases. 
In any event, it is worth noting that in addition to the issue of the Supreme Court’s
new disciplinary chamber, some of these pending cases raise the issue of the
composition and appointment procedure of the ENCJ-suspended KRS, by asking
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the ECJ that it interprets whether Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 CFR preclude a
body such as the KRS which the Commission has recently described as follows in a
document submitted to the Council before the third hearing organised under Article
7(1) TEU last December: 
The new election regime of the judges-members of the National Council
does not comply with European standards requiring that judges-members of
Councils for the Judiciary are elected by their peers. No changes have been
introduced in that respect. No remedy is foreseen to address the premature
termination of the four-year mandates of the former judges-members of the
National Council for the Judiciary. The conditions under which the Sejm
elected the new judges-members, and the first meeting of the National
Council for the Judiciary illustrate its politicisation and lack of legitimacy.
If you are not yet alarmed by the above and the sheer number of preliminary
ruling requests originating from Polish courts raising the issue of attacks on their
independence in the past few months, the section below should hopefully convince
you that it time to raise the alarm and for national governments, parliaments and
courts from other EU countries to step up to the plate. 
6. Latest insidious developments 
In a nutshell, Polish authorities are now seeking to finalise their capture of the judicial
branch and prevent any further involvement of the ECJ via the systemic – formal or
otherwise – bullying and intimidation of any judge refusing to toe the party line and
the support of the captured Constitutional Tribunal. With respect to the former, to
quote the European Commission again (document dated 11 December 2018, on file
with the authors), 
disciplinary officers appointed by the Minister of Justice continue to initiate
preliminary disciplinary investigations against judges who participated
in public debates or provided public statements about the ongoing
reforms. Preliminary disciplinary investigations concern also judges who
referred requests for preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. In addition,
disciplinary officers appointed by the Minister of Justice exercised their
power to take over investigations carried out by disciplinary officers
appointed at request of the judiciary, including in cases where the judges
concerned were found by the latter not to have committed any disciplinary
offence 
The goal here is quite obvious: due to the increasing number of referrals to the
ECJ, the ruling majority and bodies captured by it are seeking to send a (chilling)
message to all Polish judges by retaliating against those who dare to involve the
ECJ. Such state-sponsored bullying of judges making use of Article 267 is proving
to be a blueprint attractive to other ‘quasi-authoritarian’ Member States/ ‘rogue state’
and already seems to have spread to Bulgaria. 
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A particularly absurd example is the situation of the judge who is now subject
to kangaroo disciplinary proceedings for asking the ECJ (Case C-558/18) about
the compatibility of Poland’s new system of disciplinary system with EU law.
Unbelievably, this judge was then summoned by the disciplinary officer under the
control of the Minister of Justice for potential abuse of the Article 267 procedure… 
Pursuant to … You are hereby invited to submit within 14 days from the
date of delivery of this letter, a written statement regarding the possible
judicial excess [our emphasis] which resulted in the District Court in #ód#’s
request for a preliminary ruling against [our emphasis] the requirements laid
down in Article 267 [TFEU] (translated excerpt from the summons sent on
29 November 2018 to Judge Ewa Maciejewska by the deputy disciplinary
commissioner) 
As noted by the Polish Association of Judges Themis, “by instituting disciplinary
proceedings against [two] judges, the Deputy Commissioner, almost certainly
unintentionally, confirmed the argument contained in Judge Igor Tuleya’s question
requesting a preliminary ruling [Case C-563/18] that the new disciplinary procedure
has been politicized to such an extent that it can serve the purpose of exerting
unacceptable pressure on judges”. (An additional recent example of disciplinary
proceedings targeting the judge at the origin of Case C-623/18 is here).  
While these disciplinary proceedings have yet to conclude (to keep up to date:
see this website), their “chilling effect” is obvious and so is the intent of the Polish
government: to bully if not scare judges into submission since there is no one left
to defend them, the ruling party having de facto captured the Supreme Court’s new
disciplinary chamber… 
Not to be undone by these scandalous proceedings and this frontal attack against
Article 267 TFEU, “the keystone of the EU judicial system” according to the ECJ
itself, the Prosecutor General/Minister of Justice has submitted last October a
request to the pseudo Constitutional Tribunal. In a nutshell, the PG/MoJ is asking it
to assess whether Article 267 TFEU is in line with the Polish constitution (you know,
the document Polish authorities are complying with only when convenient), the key
claim being that “issues relating to the system, form and organization of the judiciary,
as well as judicial procedures, have not been transferred to the EU in the Accession
Treaty”. Should the “Constitutional Tribunal” happily oblige (and refuse to refer the
case to the ECJ prior to issuing judgment), this would be a direct challenge to the
primacy of EU law, its uniform application, and the rule of law as a foundational value
of the EU as we have never seen before. Should such a ruling materialise, we would
then expect the Commission to immediately initiate yet another infringement action
building on Case C-416/17. 
Last but not least, a new developing frontline must be paid attention to. The new
KRS – well known and widely mocked for its recent interpretation of the judicial
ethics code according to which judges cannot wear “Constitution” t-shirts – has
also brought its own case to the so-called “Constitutional Tribunal”. On its own
motion, the (captured) Polish National Council of the Judiciary has requested that
the (captured) Constitutional Tribunal finds its composition compatible with the Polish
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Constitution. Although it is up to the body which refers the case to the “Constitutional
Tribunal” to show that a disputed law is unconstitutional, it clearly seems that
the new KRS is not bothered with what it must view as only legal niceties and is
essentially urging the “Constitutional Tribunal” to rubber-stamp its politicisation.
Be that at it may, we are looking at the staggering possibility that a captured body
will come to the rescue of another captured body so as offer the ENCJ-suspended
KRS some ammunition in case of any adverse ruling from the ECJ or its eventual
exclusion from the ENCJ. 
7. Diagnosis and way forward 
To put it concisely, the situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland,
which led the Commission to finally and rightly activate Article 7(1) TEU more
than a year ago, has deteriorated further to the point of threatening the functioning
of the whole EU legal order and therefore, the future of the EU’s internal market
itself. This means that the ongoing Article 7(1) TEU procedure must continue. It is
however time for the Commission to accept that stand-alone dialogue, still presented
as its “preferred channel for resolving the systemic threat to the rule of law in
Poland”, will lead nowhere when dealing with would-be autocrats acting in bad faith.
The Commission should therefore launch accelerated infringement proceedings
regarding every single issue mentioned in its Article 7(1) reasoned proposal not yet
covered by any of the pending infringement or preliminary reference actions. 
Should the Commission fail to do so, it is time for national governments which
take the rule of law seriously and are keen to protect the EU’s internal market,
to rediscover Article 259 TFEU and bring their own infringement actions against
Poland. They should also seek to systemically intervene in every single ECJ action
where the systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland is the key issue. 
As for the Council, our key recommendation would be for it to ensure full
transparency of Article 7 proceedings by systematically publishing any connected
document it produces or receives from the EU Commission and national
governments. 
National courts have also a role to play. We would want to see as many of them
refer as many preliminary requests as possible to the ECJ should they be faced with
cases which, directly or indirectly, raise issues relating to the rule of law situation
in Poland, if only to prevent a situation where the ECJ is unable to issue rulings
because the Commission has withdrawn its infringement actions and/or the Polish
authorities have been able to “kill off” all requests via formal and informal means. 
Last but not least, the ENCJ ought to face reality and accept that the KRS cannot
be saved and ought to therefore exclude it considering the disgraceful actions and
behaviour of its members since it was suspended last September. 
Enough is enough. 
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